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I. INTRODUCTION 
K-9 units have become an invaluable resource for police 
departments and federal agencies in the war against drugs. A trained 
dog’s keen sense of smell alerts officers to the presence of 
contraband, thereby leading to the prompt apprehension of drug 
traffickers, dealers, and the like. The United States Supreme Court has 
approved warrantless use of K-9 units in several situations: public 
airports, routine drug stops, and narcotics detection points.1 In Florida 
v. Jardines,2 the Court will determine for the first time whether sniff 
tests on private premises violate the Fourth Amendment. This case 
will serve as a conduit for the Court to refine the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections of the home. The Court will address 
whether sniff tests within the curtilage of an individual’s residence 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court will 
likely decide that its holdings in previous dog-sniff cases, which 
involved private property in public places, are inapplicable to the facts 
present in Jardines. Additionally, because dog-sniff tests violate a 
homeowner’s reasonable and justifiable expectation to be free from 
the government’s prying eyes (and nose) within his home, they likely 
violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 2014 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  See generally Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding sniff test of an 
automobile during a routine traffic stop did not constitute a search); City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding sniff test of an automobile during a narcotics detection 
stop did not constitute a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding sniff test 
of luggage at an airport did not constitute a search). 
 2.  Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 2012). 
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II. FACTS 
In November 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade 
Police Department received an unverified Crime Stoppers tip that 
Respondent, Joelis Jardines, was using his home to grow marijuana.3 A 
month later, Jardines’s home was the subject of surveillance by the 
Miami-Dade Police Department, the Narcotics Bureau, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration.4 The surveillance began at 7 a.m., when 
Detective Pedraja briefly examined Jardines’s house while waiting for 
a drug detection dog and his handler to arrive.5 When the drug 
detection dog, Franky, and his handler, Detective Douglas Bartlet, 
arrived, the two conducted a “sniff test” on Jardines’s property.6 
The dog-sniff unit and Detective Pedraja entered the property 
through the driveway and headed toward the front door.7 During the 
sniff test, Franky was at the lead followed by Detectives Bartlet and 
Pedraja.8 During the approach to the front door, Franky picked up the 
smell of contraband and alerted his handler of the odor.9 Although 
Detective Bartlet had not crossed the archway immediately adjacent 
to Jardines’s front door, Franky’s sniff test culminated in him sitting at 
the base of the door, indicating the strongest point of the odor.10 
After Detective Bartlet told Detective Pedraja that the sniff test 
was positive, Detective Bartlet and Franky left to assist with other 
cases.11 Detective Pedraja left approximately fifteen minutes later to 
prepare a search warrant for Jardines’s house.12 During this time, 
federal agents “remained behind to maintain surveillance of Jardines’ 
home.”13 After obtaining the warrant, police officers and federal 
agents gained entry to Jardines’s home.14 Jardines was apprehended 
after fleeing from his home through an exit at the rear of his house.15 
 
 3.  Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla. 2011) cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (U.S. Jan. 6, 
2012) (No. 11-564). 
 4.  Id. at 46. 
 5.  Id. at 37. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Brief for Petitioner at 4, Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2012). 
 8.  Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 46. 
 9.  Id. at 46–47. A detection dog’s alert consists of bracketing—a technique involving a 
back-and-forth walk until the dog finds the strongest point of the odor, at which point the dog 
sits. Id. at 47. 
 10.  Id. at 46–47. 
 11.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 4. 
 12.  Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 48. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment has long protected the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable search and seizure. . . .”16 Despite the Fourth 
Amendment’s historical rooting in the idea of protecting private 
property against physical invasions, the Supreme Court since clarified 
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”17 To ensure 
searches are conducted in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, 
they must first be approved by a judge or magistrate.18 Warrantless 
searches are presumptively unlawful because the Constitution 
requires that the “deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer 
be interposed between the citizen and the police.”19 To determine 
whether Fourth Amendment protection applies to a particular case, 
the Court employs Justice Harlan’s expectation-of-privacy analysis. To 
trigger the Fourth Amendment, a person must exhibit an “actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.”20 Originally proposed in Katz v. United 
States,21 the standard was accepted by the Court in Smith v. 
Maryland.22 Ultimately, Jardines requires the Court to reconcile two 
heretofore distinct lines of Fourth Amendment case law—cases 
governing privacy rights within the home and cases concerning the 
use of dog-sniff tests. 
A. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Afforded in the Home 
Though the Court has affirmed that the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment extend beyond mere property rights, it has also 
reiterated that the home remains central to the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections.23 In two distinct cases, the Court has held that warrantless 
searches that reveal private information concerning the home are 
Fourth Amendment searches when the private information could not 
 
 16.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 17.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967). 
 18.  See id. at 357 (“[T]he mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to 
judicial processes . . . and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 
(quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 21.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 22.  442 U.S. 735 (1979); id. at 740; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). 
 23.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51. 
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be obtained otherwise.24 
A Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever details concerning 
the interior of the house are uncovered using a technological or 
sense-enhancing device.25 In United States v. Karo,26 DEA agents 
placed a beeper into a can of ether that would later be used to process 
cocaine.27 The can had been moved periodically until it ultimately 
entered the defendant’s possession within his home.28 Although “the 
actual placement of the beeper into the can violated no one’s Fourth 
Amendment rights,”29 the monitoring of the beeper constituted a 
Fourth Amendment search of the defendant’s residence.30 Though the 
Court acknowledged that “the monitoring of an electronic device . . . 
is, of course, less intrusive than a full scale search,” it nonetheless 
“reveal[s] a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the 
Government . . . could not have otherwise obtained without a 
warrant.”31 
Additionally, privacy protection does not vanish simply because 
the devices used to obtain protected information never entered the 
home.32 In Kyllo v. United States,33 agents of the Department of the 
Interior used a thermal imaging device “to determine whether [the] 
amount of heat . . . emanating from petitioner’s home [was] consistent 
with the use” of high-intensity lamps used to grow marijuana.34 Unlike 
in Karo, the device was used from beyond the curtilage of the 
defendant’s home.35 Nonetheless, the Court held that information 
 
 24.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2011) (holding the use of an infrared 
scanner a Fourth Amendment search because it could reveal, among other private details, “at 
what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath”); United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (holding the placement of a beeper inside a can that entered the 
defendant’s home a Fourth Amendment search because it revealed private details of the home; 
that is, the location of the can). 
 25.  See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (stating there is no distinction between the government agent 
who enters a home without a warrant to obtain information versus the government agent who, 
without a warrant, uses technology to obtain the same information). 
 26.  468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 27.  Id. at 708. 
 28.  Id. at 708–10. 
 29.  Id. at 711. 
 30.  Id. at 714. 
 31.  Id. at 715. 
 32.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–36 (2011) (holding the use of an infrared 
scanner from beyond the curtilage of a home to be a Fourth Amendment search because it 
reveals private details about the interior of the home). 
 33.  533 U.S. 27 (2011). 
 34.  Id. at 29. 
 35.  Id. at 30. 
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obtained using “sense-enhancing technology . . . regarding the interior 
of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained . . . 
constitutes a search.”36 Furthermore, the Court clarified that the 
distinction between “off-the-wall” and “through-the-wall” imaging 
devices does not alter the substance of whether a Fourth Amendment 
search has occurred.37 Finally, the Court indicated that the quality of 
the information obtained also has no effect on the Court’s analysis 
because “all details [of the home] are intimate details.”38 Although the 
Government “contend[ed] that the thermal imaging was 
constitutional because it did not detect private activities occurring in 
private areas,” the Court disagreed.39 In reflecting upon its previous 
home-related cases, the Court held that none of its cases have been 
decided by the “quality or quantity of information obtained,” but 
rather “because the entire area is held safe from prying government 
eyes.”40 
B. The Fourth Amendment and Searches Involving Drug-Detection 
Dogs 
The Court has reviewed whether the Fourth Amendment protects 
private property subjected to dog-sniff tests three times.41 Despite the 
varying factual contexts of the three cases,42 the Court held in each 
case that the sniff tests did not violate the Fourth Amendment.43 In 
 
 36.  Id. at 34. 
 37.  Id. at 36. In Kyllo, the government argued that no information was gleaned concerning 
the interior of the home via the thermal imager. Id. at 35. Instead, the device merely captured 
heat eradiating from the “external surface of the house.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court 
rejected the “mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz.” Id. In Katz, a 
listening device was placed on the outside of a telephone booth to record the defendant’s 
conversation inside. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1987). Although the Court 
acknowledged that “no physical penetration of the telephone booth” had occurred, the Fourth 
Amendment had been expanded to encompass intrusions beyond physical trespass. See id. at 
351–53 (noting that the Court has departed from the “narrow view” that the Amendment 
requires the presence of a physical intrusion onto a property interest). 
 38.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See generally Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding sniff test of an 
automobile during a routine traffic stop did not constitute a search); City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding sniff test of an automobile during a narcotics detection 
stop did not constitute a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding sniff test 
of luggage at an airport did not constitute a search). 
 42.  It is important to note that all three cases involved private property seized in public 
places. 
 43.  See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (“Official conduct that does not ‘compromise any 
legitimate interest in privacy’ is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting 
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these cases, the Court held that searches were permissible because 
citizens do not have a legally protectable interest in possessing 
contraband.44 
Sniff tests of private property exposed to the public, such as 
luggage in an airport, are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.45 
In United States v. Place,46 the Court reviewed the seizure of Raymond 
Place’s personal luggage at an airport, which was later subject to a 
sniff test.47 Although Place, like all individuals, retained “a privacy 
interest in the contents of personal luggage,” the sniff test conducted 
on his luggage did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search for two 
reasons.48 First, sniff tests invade no legally protected interest because 
they merely reveal the presence of contraband.49 Second, no actual 
“search” within the Fourth Amendment occurs during sniff tests 
because the tests do not involve opening luggage, are minimally 
intrusive, and do not subject the owner “to the embarrassment and 
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive” 
methods.50 
Similarly, sniff tests conducted during a lawful traffic stop do not 
amount to a Fourth Amendment search. In Indianapolis v. Edmond,51 
the Court analogized “an exterior sniff of an automobile” for 
narcotics detection at a highway checkpoint to the search conducted 
in Place.52 Because sniffs “do[] not require entry into the car and [are] 
not designed to disclose any information other than the presence of 
narcotics,” no Fourth Amendment search occurs. The Court 
elaborated on the issue of sniff tests during lawful traffic stops in 
Illinois v. Caballes.53 In Caballes, the Court reiterated that no Fourth 
Amendment search occurs without a violation of a legitimate interest 
 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“[A]n exterior 
sniff . . . is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of 
narcotics.”); Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (“Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence 
of narcotics, a contraband item.”). 
 44.  See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. 
 45.  Place, 462 U.S. at 698. 
 46.  462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 47.  Id. at 699. 
 48.  Id. at 707 (emphasis added). More particularly, the sniff tests do not expose 
“noncontraband items that would otherwise remain hidden from public view.” Id. 
 49.  See id. (noting that sniff tests expose limited information only relating to the 
possession of contraband). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 52.  Id. at 40. 
 53.  543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
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in privacy.54 Because individuals do not have a legal interest in the 
possession of contraband, dog-sniff tests that reveal contraband do 
not constitute searches.55 
In Jardines, the Court will have to clear the blurry line that divides 
legally acceptable behavior from acts that amount to Fourth 
Amendment searches. On the one hand, it has repeatedly held that 
private details concerning the home are protected by the 
Amendment, regardless of the information that is revealed. On the 
other hand, it has approved dog-sniff tests for detecting contraband 
because they do not invade a legally protected interest. Because the 
two propositions cannot stand together, the Court must decide which 
principle is stronger when sniff tests occur on private property. 
IV. HOLDING 
In Jardines v. State,56 the Florida Supreme Court held that a 
warrantless sniff test conducted within the curtilage of an individual’s 
home—specifically, the area adjacent to the front door—is a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.57 In reaching this conclusion, the court first 
analyzed whether the Supreme Court’s prior decisions concerning 
sniff tests were applicable to the facts presented.58 After answering in 
the negative, the court considered whether dog-sniff tests performed 
on a person’s property constituted a Fourth Amendment violation for 
separate reasons.59 
The court first discussed the dog-sniff cases examined by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court held that 
sniff tests of a person’s property in public violated no Fourth 
Amendment protection.60 Although the factual background of each 
case varied, two consistent themes emerged. First, dog-sniff tests are 
sui generis61 because they reveal only limited information using a 
 
 54.  Id. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984)); see supra note 
43 and accompanying text. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-564). 
 57.  Id. at 55–56. 
 58.  Id. at 44–45. 
 59.  Id. at 45–50. 
 60.  Id. at 40–42. 
 61.  “Of its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th 
ed. 2009). The Supreme Court has stated that sniff tests are treated as “sui generis because 
[they] disclose[] only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.” Caballes, 543 
U.S. at 409. 
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method “less intrusive than a typical search.”62 Second, the Fourth 
Amendment protects an individual’s “legitimate expectations of 
privacy” which excludes the possession of contraband.63 In 
distinguishing Jardines’s situation from the other dog-sniff cases, the 
Florida Supreme Court stated that “the United State Supreme Court 
was careful to tie its ruling to the particular facts” of each particular 
case. Furthermore, the court noted nothing indicated the analysis 
would apply to a “sniff test conducted at a private residence.”64 The 
court further distinguished the facts in Jardines by explaining that 
each of the dog-sniff cases involved property that had been exposed 
to the public and that the tests were minimally invasive and applied in 
a non-discriminatory manner.65 
The court then considered whether the Fourth Amendment 
protects homes from warrantless sniff tests performed on private 
property. Without specifically discussing which interest the Fourth 
Amendment protects, the court determined that dog-sniff tests 
conducted at private residences constitute “a substantial government 
intrusion into the sanctity of the home.”66 The court first explained 
that the “sanctity of the citizen’s home” is “[a]t the very core of the 
Fourth Amendment.”67 The court then noted two specific ways sniff 
tests invade the sanctity of one’s home.68 Specifically, the court stated 
that sniff tests are “a sophisticated undertaking” that “invariably 
entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment 
for the resident” regardless of the homeowner’s presence during the 
search.69 Additionally, the court noted that sniff tests performed at 
private residences lack the “objective, uniform application of [the] 
tests” that were guaranteed in the dog-sniff cases.70 Because “a private 
residence is not susceptible to being seized beforehand based on 
 
 62.  Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 40 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 
(2000)). 
 63.  Id. at 40–41. 
 64.  Id. at 45. 
 65.  Id. A major focus for the Jardines court was the invasiveness of the sniff test on 
Jardines’s house versus the invasiveness of the sniff tests in the dog-sniff cases. For example, the 
court highlights the humiliation that residents may suffer in their neighborhood when their 
homes are surrounded by federal and state agents and subjected to a sniff test. See id. at 48–49 
(“Such a public spectacle [the sniff test] unfolding in a residential neighborhood will invariably 
entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment for the resident . . . .”). 
 66.  Id. at 49. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 46–50. 
 69.  Id. at 48. 
 70.  Id. at 49. 
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objective criteria,” the court felt that dog-sniff tests, such as the one in 
the present case, could be applied in an “arbitrary or discriminatory 
manner, or based on whim and fancy, at the home of any citizen.”71 
V. ARGUMENTS 
Both parties’ briefs focus on how the Court’s earlier dog-sniff 
cases and privacy-in-the-home cases inform whether sniff tests of a 
residence are searches under the Fourth Amendment. The State of 
Florida contends that the location of sniff tests does not alter the 
expectation-of-privacy analysis and that the search violates no 
legitimate interest in privacy because the sniff test detects only 
contraband and not private information concerning the home. By 
contrast, Jardines argues that sniff tests violate a homeowner’s 
expectation of privacy because they reveal private information about 
the home. Jardines also argues that the warrantless sniff test of his 
private residence effectively was a common-law trespass, thereby 
constituting a Fourth Amendment search.72 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
The State appeals from the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on 
two grounds. First, the State argues that a dog-sniff test is not a Fourth 
Amendment search because of its sui generis nature.73 Second, the 
State argues that a dog-sniff test does not become an unlawful search 
simply because it takes place within the curtilage of a private 
residence.74 
The State first examines the dog-sniff cases and notes that the 
Court has repeatedly held that dog-sniff tests are lawful because they 
are sui generis and “much less intrusive than a typical search.”75 
Additionally, because sniff tests do not “disclose any information 
other than the presence or absence of narcotics,” no legitimate 
interest in privacy is violated, and therefore no search has occurred.76 
The State relies on Caballes to extend the reasoning of the Court’s 
dog-sniff cases to the facts presented in Jardines. The State argues that 
the Caballes Court distinguished Kyllo from Caballes based on the 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  This argument has not previously been raised in this case. 
 73.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 11. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 13 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). 
 76.  Id. at 14–15. 
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nature of the information obtained, rather than the location of the 
test.77 The State also references the Caballes Court’s reliance on the 
contraband exception established in United States v. Jacobsen78 in 
arguing that the contraband exception exempts “from the Fourth 
Amendment . . . the method of finding . . . contraband.”79 
The State then argues that sniff tests do not become unlawful 
searches simply because they occur immediately outside of a home. 
The State contends that the Fourth Amendment does not “proscribe 
officers from approaching the front door of a home,” and thus dogs 
are not prevented from approaching alongside the officers.80 
Additionally, since the plain view doctrine does not protect “[w]hat a 
person exposes publicly,” information obtained by an officer’s vision 
or sense of smell does not violate the Fourth Amendment.81 
Moreover, the State argues that sniff tests reveal nothing about the 
interior of the house but only information about the “air outside the 
house.”82 Finally, the State analogizes the “use of a dog’s nose instead 
of that of an officer’s” to a tool, which merely aids police officers’ 
senses, much like a flashlight.83 
The State distinguishes the dog-sniff test in Jardines from the 
infrared camera scans discussed in Kyllo by discussing the 
“fundamentally different nature” of the tools.84 For example, the State 
highlights the difference between the “binary nature” of sniff tests 
and the ability of emerging technological devices to detect lawful, as 
well as unlawful, activity.85 Unlike the methods at issue in Kyllo, the 
State argues, dog-sniff tests cannot reveal “information other than the 
 
 77.  Id. at 16. 
 78.  466 U.S. 109 (1984). In Jacobsen, the Court explained that warrantless seizure of 
contraband does not implicate the Fourth Amendment because there is no “justifiable 
expectation of privacy” in possessing contraband. See id. at 121–22 (noting that seizure of 
contraband was acceptable because “it is well-settled that it is constitutionally reasonable for 
law enforcement officials to seize ‘effects’ that cannot support a justifiable expectation of 
privacy without a warrant.”). 
 79.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 16–17. 
 80.  Id. at 20 (“No serious argument exists that the Fourth Amendment proscribes officers 
from approaching the front door of a home.”). 
 81.  Id. at 21. 
 82.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 83.  Id. at 22. The government relies on the approved use of tools to aid an officer’s senses. 
Id. 
 84.  Id. at 23. 
 85.  See id. at 23–24 (“Unlike the high-tech devices in Kyllo and Jones, or even the low-tech 
flashlight in United States v. Dunn, dogs are not high-tech or ‘advancing’ devices that threaten 
privacy.”). 
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location of a substance that no individual has the right to possess.”86 
Furthermore, the State distinguishes sniff tests from technology-aided 
searches by arguing that dogs have been used “for centuries all 
without modification or improvement.”87 Because sniff tests do not 
“represent rapid technological change” that “permit[s] easy and cheap 
monitoring” of private facts in private residences, the State argues 
that “the rationale of Kyllo and [the] concerns of Jones do not apply” 
to dog-sniff tests.88 
Finally, the State addresses a policy concern raised by the Florida 
Supreme Court in Jardines. Specifically, the State argues that the dog-
sniff test is a century-old law enforcement technique that is not 
susceptible to abuse in the form of dragnet-style sweeps of entire 
neighborhoods.89 The State claims that no such sweeps have occurred 
since Caballes and, moreover, sweeps of entire neighborhoods would 
be both time-consuming and costly in practice.90 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
In response, Jardines argues that sniff tests on private property 
violate the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. First, such tests 
presumptively violate a homeowner’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.91 Second, sniff tests on private property are a form common-
law trespass which further violates a homeowner’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.92 
Jardines contends that the use of a sniff test violates the 
homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy because it reveals the 
intimate, private details of the home.93 Jardines emphasizes Kyllo 
when arguing that “the nature of the information obtained . . . is not 
relevant to the determination of whether a Fourth Amendment 
search has occurred.”94 Jardines bolsters this argument by analogizing 
the facts of this case to Karo and Arizona v. Hicks.95 In Karo, even 
though the “only thing detected” was the presence of contraband, the 
 
 86.  Id. at 23 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005)). 
 87.  Id. at 24. 
 88.  Id. at 23–25. 
 89.  Id. at 26–27. 
 90.  Id. at 27–28. 
 91.  Brief for Respondent at 9, Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564 (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
 92.  Id. at 12. 
 93.  Id. at 15. 
 94.  Id. at 21. 
 95.  480 U.S. 321 (1987); Brief for Respondent, supra note 91, at 21–25. 
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Court held that a Fourth Amendment search had occurred.96 Because 
the police had obtained information concerning the interior of the 
house that could not have been obtained otherwise, a warrant was 
required, despite the search’s minimal intrusiveness.97 In Hicks, police 
received a warrant before obtaining information related to the 
interior of the house.98 The warrant, however, limited the scope of the 
search, and action that exceeded that scope and revealed unrelated 
information constituted a Fourth Amendment search.99 Both cases, 
Jardines argues, illustrate that the exposure of intimate details of the 
home—whether without a warrant or beyond the scope of a 
warrant—violate the homeowner’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.100 
Jardines then distinguishes the dog-sniff cases from his case. First, 
Jardines argues that the location of the searches in Place, Edmond, 
and Caballes are key aspects of each case’s outcome.101 All three cases 
involved private property located in a public place.102 Jardines argues 
that individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy about the 
details inside the home, whereas individuals who expose their private 
property in a public place do not retain that interest.103 Specifically, the 
dog-sniff cases “do not involve the historical foundations of the 
Fourth Amendment” that protect the home “from prying government 
eyes.”104 
Jardines also highlights the risk of invasive and indiscriminate 
random searches.105 Contrary to the State’s position, Jardines argues 
 
 96.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 91, at 21–22. 
 97.  See id. at 22 (discussing the occurrence of the Fourth Amendment search in Karo 
despite the fact that “a beeper is less intrusive than a full search.” (quoting United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 98.  Id. at 23–24. 
 99.  Id. Even though the officers possessed a warrant, “action, unrelated to the objective of 
the authorized intrusion . . . produce[d] a new invasion . . . unjustified by the exigent 
circumstances that validated the entry.” Id. (quoting Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325). 
 100.  See id. at 23–24 (“Nevertheless, the Court held in both cases that the officer’s acts in 
disclosing the presence of . . . objects inside the home constituted a Fourth Amendment search 
because all details in the home are held safe from prying government eyes.”). 
 101.  See id. at 29 (“The Court’s decisions demonstrate that whether a police action reveals 
details inside a home is the critical factor which establishes that the governmental action is a 
Fourth Amendment search.”). 
 102.  Id. at 26–32. 
 103.  Id. at 29. 
 104.  Id. at 30. 
 105.  See id. at 32–39 (discussing the policy implications that would result if “law 
enforcement officers could release a trained cocaine-sensitive dog . . . to roam the streets at 
random . . . .” (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., 
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that allowing suspicionless sniff tests incentivizes states to create 
technologies that could reveal the presence of contraband, or other 
private information, with minimal overhead.106 If police are able to 
perform dragnet-style sweeps of neighborhoods, “the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 
secure . . . only in the discretion of the police.”107 
Jardines also argues that sniff tests violate the Fourth Amendment 
because they reveal information about the interior despite detecting 
odors outside the home. In Karo, there was “no difference between 
the acts of a government agent in entering the house . . . and the 
surreptitious use of an electronic device to obtain the same 
information.”108 This view is consistent with Kyllo, which addressed the 
intrusiveness of technological devices used to obtain private 
information from a home that was not otherwise available.109 
Additionally, Jardines argues that, contrary to the State’s position, a 
dog’s nose is not a tool that aids the senses of the police officer.110 And 
finally, Jardines addresses the State’s exterior/interior dichotomy by 
noting that the Court rejected similar arguments in both Katz and 
Kyllo.111 
Jardines concludes by arguing that a sniff test outside the door of 
a private residence is a Fourth Amendment search for two additional 
reasons: first, the front door is within the curtilage of the house; and 
second, entering onto private property to administer a sniff test is a 
common-law trespass. Because the curtilage of the home is 
“intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically,” 
the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to extend to it.112 
Jardines concedes that egress and ingress do not immediately trigger 
the Fourth Amendment because of the implied consent given for a 
 
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 106.  See id. at 37–38 (“Presumably . . . States will be just as eager to use current technology 
and develop and use new technological innovations which will reveal only the presence of 
contraband inside a home.”). 
 107.  Id. at 37 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 108.  Id. at 40. 
 109.  Id. at 41–42. 
 110.  Id. at 43. Rather, narcotics dogs use their own senses to provide the officers 
information, rather than enhancing the officers’ senses to similarly detect the same information. 
Id. 
 111.  See id. at 45–46 (discussing the Court’s rejection of an “off-the-wall” versus “through-
the-wall” distinction in Kyllo and “inference” argument in Karo). 
 112.  Id. at 48 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1986)). 
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private citizen or police officer to enter the premises for various 
reasons.113 Nonetheless, there is no implied consent for police officers 
to enter the premises with the intent to obtain “otherwise 
undiscoverable evidence.”114 Therefore, even without a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, “a police officer’s actions . . . can constitute a 
Fourth Amendment search” when the officer’s intent is to search for 
evidence.115 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
It is likely that the Court will rule in favor of Jardines, once again 
affirming that the sanctity of the home remains central to the Fourth 
Amendment. First, the Court will likely find that its previous dog-sniff 
cases are inapplicable within the context of a private residence. 
Second, the Court will likely hold that Jardines’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his residence was violated when a 
warrantless sniff test was conducted on his private residence. 
The Court will likely rule that Place, Edmond, and Caballes are 
inapplicable within the context of private residences. The dog-sniff 
cases all involved private property outside of the home.116 Unlike 
Jardines, the individuals in the dog-sniff cases possessed no legitimate 
private interest that could be intruded upon by a sniff test—at least, 
not in the possession of contraband.117 No search occurs unless a 
legitimate interest in privacy is compromised.118 Jardines, however, 
maintained a right to be free of the government’s prying eye within 
his own home.119 To be sure, the Caballes Court was careful to 
reconcile its decision with Kyllo, where the use of technology to 
discover private information within a home was considered a Fourth 
Amendment search.120 The Court found that “the fact that the device 
 
 113.  See id. at 53, 55 (“A person who enters upon the property of another is not a trespasser 
if consent to enter may be implied from custom, usage, or conduct.”). 
 114.  Id. at 55. 
 115.  Id. at 59. 
 116.  See discussion supra note 1. 
 117.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (“We have held that any interest 
in possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate’ and thus, governmental conduct that 
only reveals the possession of contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interest.” (quoting 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections of the intimate details of the home). 
 120.  Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10. 
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was capable of detecting lawful activity was critical to Kyllo.”121 
However, reading the Caballes decision so narrowly would be at odds 
with Kyllo itself. In Kyllo, the Court stated that “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to 
measurement of quality or quantity of information obtained.”122 If the 
search in Kyllo implicated the Fourth Amendment solely because the 
device used could detect lawful information, then the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection must necessarily be tied to the quality of the 
information obtained. 
Furthermore, the location of the tests in the dog-sniff cases 
invariably played a crucial role in the Court’s analysis. Assuming, 
arguendo, that sniff tests can reveal legitimate information,123 the dog-
sniff cases would be no different than Kyllo absent the location of the 
test. On the other hand, if sniff tests are in fact sui generis, the cases 
would be identical to Karo. In either scenario, discounting the 
location of the sniff test would result in incompatible outcomes. In the 
former, allowing sniff tests at the home would be inconsistent with 
Kyllo’s prohibition of information gathering using sense-enhancing 
technology.124 In Karo, the placement of a beeper could only reveal 
the presence of unlawful activity (akin to a sniff test’s sui generis 
results), yet the Court found that its placement amounted to a Fourth 
Amendment search. With little else to distinguish the cases, the 
location of the searches must play a significant role in the Court’s 
determination of whether a search has occurred. 
Second, the Court will likely find that Jardines’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his home was violated when sniff tests were 
conducted on his private residence. In Kyllo, the case most analogous 
to Jardines, the Court held that a Fourth Amendment search occurs 
 
 121.  Id. at 410. 
 122.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. 
 123.  See Brief for The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. as Amicus 
Curiae for Respondent at 8–15, Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564 (U.S. July 2, 2012), for a 
discussion on dog-sniff tests revealing legitimate information protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 124.  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home . . . constitutes a search . . . .”). If sniff tests can 
reveal information concerning legitimate and lawful activities, the result should be no different 
than the outcome in Kyllo. At the very least, the agents in Kyllo gained information concerning 
the house using technology from beyond the curtilage. Here, the information was gathered from 
within the curtilage, signaling a greater invasion of Jardines’s residence. See United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (likening the placement of a tracking beeper inside Karo’s home 
to the physical intrusion of Karo’s property). 
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when information concerning the interior of the home is obtained 
without a warrant.125 When DEA agents used a thermal imager to 
detect “information . . . that could not otherwise have been obtained 
without physical intrusion,” a Fourth Amendment search had 
occurred.126 Despite the Government’s argument that sniff tests are 
sui generis and reveal nothing but the presence of contraband, the 
Kyllo Court already rejected a similar argument.127 Because “all 
details are intimate details,” the Court did not distinguish between 
activities that suggested the possession or location of contraband 
from private, lawful activities.128 This view is consistent with the 
Court’s holding in Karo. There, information obtained via an electronic 
device placed inside the home was deemed to be a Fourth 
Amendment search.129 Notably, the Court reasoned that the search 
occurred because the information “could not have been obtained by 
observation from outside the curtilage of the house.”130 In Jardines, the 
sniff test occurred within the curtilage of the house, which suggests 
that the sniff test was an even greater intrusion into Jardines’s right to 
retreat into the confines of his own home than the intrusion in Karo.131 
This view is consistent with the Court’s analysis in other Fourth 
Amendment cases. For example, in California v. Ciraolo,132 the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when police 
flew a private charter plane over a marijuana field in his uncovered 
backyard.133 Although the Court recognized that the curtilage is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, the defendant’s public exposure 
of the field moved him beyond the purview of the Amendment’s 
protections.134 More importantly, the Court focused its decision on the 
 
 125.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 37. 
 128.  See id. at 37–38 (discussing how the relative warmth of the home was an intimate 
detail, despite it possibly relating to lamps used to grow marijuana). 
 129.  Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. 
 130.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 131.  The intrusive nature of the sniff test may be cause for a heightened review of the 
existence of a Fourth Amendment protection. A physically invasive inspection may expose an 
individual to “great indignity . . . and it is not to be undertaken lightly.” Bond v. United States, 
529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968)). 
 132.  476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 133.  See id. at 214 (“[I]t is unreasonable for respondent to expect his marijuana plants were 
constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye . . . .”). 
 134.  See id. at 213. (“The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been 
extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on 
public thoroughfares.”). The Court explained in Katz, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” 
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defendant’s voluntary exposure of the marijuana, suggesting that had 
it remained covered and “protected from being observed with the 
naked eye,” the Fourth Amendment may have been implicated.135 
Jardines, on the other hand, took steps to prevent “observ[ation] with 
the naked eye” or, in this case, the nose, by keeping it within his home. 
In Bond v. United States,136 the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated when a federal agent engaged in a “careful tactile 
exploration of the outer surface” of the defendant’s bag, which was 
placed in the overhead bin of a bus.137 Although the agent discovered 
methamphetamine—in which Bond had no legitimate privacy 
interest138—he nonetheless had a reasonable expectation that his bag 
would not be handled in such an “exploratory manner.”139 
Homeowners, including Jardines, have an even stronger expectation 
that their homes will not be subject to warrantless sniff tests or other 
exploratory searches, regardless of whether or not their homes are 
being used for unlawful purposes. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Court will likely reaffirm the sanctity of the home as a central 
tenet of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in deciding Jardines. 
Because the sniff test conducted on Jardines’s residence varies 
considerably from earlier dog-sniff cases, the Court will likely use 
Kyllo and Karo to distinguish the legality of such tests in a private-
residence context. To hold otherwise would surely chip away at 
Fourth Amendment protections, largely diminishing the traditional 
importance of the private details of one’s household. 
 
 
United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 135.  See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215. 
 136.  529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
 137.  Id. at 337–38. 
 138.  See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338. Bond’s expectation, which society recognized as reasonable, 
translated into a Fourth Amendment protection. See id. 
